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4ECENT CASES
of risk theory. Therefore, the plaintiff would not be barred unless his
injury was a possible result within the risk to which the plaintiff had
subjected himself. This is a more exact method of determining the
plaintiff's negligence, and would give the trial judge and jury more
precise standards by allowing them to weigh the plaintiff's act in
relation to the risk created.
William G. Kohlhepp
CmnwNAL PnocEm'Ri.-S.amH PwoR To ARBEs.-The defendant was
walking down a deserted street in the heart of New York City at
8:15 a.m., carrying a shotgun. When questioned about the gun by
two police officers, he replied that he was going hunting. The officers,
after discovering that the gun was loaded, ordered the defendant to
accompany them to the police station for further questioning. While
putting the defendant into the patrol car, one of the officers touched
the defendant's clothing, and felt an object about the size of a pistol.
A formal search revealed that the defendant had in his possession a
pistol, a tear gas gun, and two knives. He was then arrested and two
charges were filed against him, one relating to the shotgun, the other
to his possession of concealed weapons. The charge relating to the
shotgun was dismissed. The defendant moved to suppress the evi-
dence that was taken from him on the ground that it was obtained
by an illegal search before the arrest. Held: Motion denied. Since
the officers had probable cause to believe that a criminal act was
being committed in their presence, they were "authorized to arrest
the defendant or to search his person incidental to such an arrest."
People v. Salerno, 285 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1962).
The United States Constitution' and all state constitutions 2 have
provisions which afford protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To give effect to this protection, the Supreme Court has
ruled that all federal3 and state4 courts must exclude evidence
obtained by such unreasonable searches. Thus, the issue in the prin-
cipal case was whether a search made by officers prior to an arrest,
upon probable cause that a crime was being committed in their
presence, was unreasonable.
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 E.g., Ala. Coast. art. 1, § 5; Alaska Const. art. I, § 14.
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).4 Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Some courts adopt the view that such a search is unreasonable.5
As stated in United States v. Royster:
The law of search is governed by the Fourth Amendment as construed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. As thus construed, the
Fourth Amendment outlaws all searches made without a warrant ex-
cepting those incident to a lawful arrest... [T]he right to search with-
out a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest is a narrow exception to
the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment and has its roots in necessity.
The necessity in such cases arises from the need to protect the arresting
officer, to deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape and to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence by the person arrested.... The neces-
sity which justifies a search incident to an arrest does not and can not
arise until an actual arrest is made. It is apparent, therefore, that a
lawful arrest is an indispensable prerequisite to a valid search incident
thereto. 6
It seems that the Kentucky Court of Appeals accepted this view in
Hall v. Commonwealth:
Section 10 of our Constitution guarantees that our citizens will be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable search
and seizure. Under this section no citizends house, person or possessions
may be searched before his arrest without a warrant issued for such
search.... (Emphasis added.) 7
The reasons for this rule are well stated in another Kentucky case:
To sanction such [a search before a legal arrest] would be too dangerous
to the hard earned liberties of a free people. It is a better that a man.
. ..who certainly deserved to suffer the penalty provided by law for
carrying a concealed weapon, entirely go free on such a charge rather
than to sanction his present conviction by an illegal invasion of that
liberty guaranteed to him and his forefathers .... 8
Other courts take the view adopted in the principal case that a
search made prior to an arrest is reasonable if the officers have prob-
able cause to believe that a criminal act is being committed in their
presence.9 Many of these courts, however, require that the search and
the arrest be so near in time as to be practically simultaneous.10
547 Am. Jur. Searches and Seizures § 53 (1948); 79 C.J.S. Searches and
Seizures § 66 (1952); Cogan, The Law of Search and Seizure 28 (1952). "There
can never be any occasion where a person may be successfully and legally searched
unless it is an incident to a lawful arrest."
6 204 F. Supp. 760, 762-63 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
"261 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. 1953); accord, Commonwealth v. Vaughn 296
S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1956); Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 81, 212 S.W.2d 537
(1948); Banks v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 762, 261 S.W. 262 (1924); Youman v.
Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
8 Powell v. Commonwealth, 807 Ky. 545, 548, 211 S.W.2d 850, 851 (1948).
9 People v. Rodriguez, 22 Cal. Rep. 824 (1962); People v. Clifton, 169 Cal.
App. 617, 837 P.2d 871 (1959); Jones v. State, 264 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1954).
10 State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Ad. 636 (1924); State v. Hoover,
219 Ore. 288, 347 P.2d 69 (1959).
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While it is accepted by both views that a search made incidental
to a lawful arrest is reasonable, the difference between the two turns
upon the meaning which has been given by each to the word "inci-
dental." Under the first view if the search is made prior to the arrest,
the search is not "incidental," as this view requires the search to
follow the arrest. The second view, as adopted in the principal case
is that even if the search precedes the arrest, it may be incidental.
The decision of the principal case is not justified. The facts and
circumstances which prompted the search clearly indicated that the
defendant had present intention to commit a criminal act. Thus, the
officers had sufficient reason to effect an arrest of the defendant prior
to the search. While it might be advantageous to permit a search
prior to an arrest to avoid unnecessary arrests, this advantage is
greatly outweighed by the restriction that such a rule places on the
citizen's rights of security and privacy. An analysis of the decisions
rendered since adoption of the constitutional guarantees against un-
reasonable searches and seizures reveals an ever increasing area of
"reasonable" searches accompanied by increasing restrictions on the
rights of security and privacy. The ultimate test for the necessity of
the rule in the principal case is a test of public utility. Therefore, since
the view requiring the arrest to precede the search meets present law
enforcement needs, there are no social or economic values which
warrant courts adopting the broader rule.
foe Harrison
BANKRUPTCY-STATUTORY BAR TO HABrruAL DISCHARGE NOT APPLi-
CABLE TO CnAPTER XIII WAGE EuNEa PL".-Debtor filed a wage
earner plan under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act' seeking an
extension of time to pay his debts in full. The proceeding was dis-
missed by the referee in bankruptcy because the debtor had received
confirmation of an extension within six years preceding the filing
of his present plan. The referee held that chapter III, section 14,
(c) (5)2 barred a subsequent confirmation within a six year period.
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas affirmed.
Debtor appealed to the court of appeals for the tenth circuit. Held:
152 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1958).
230 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (1952) provides:
"The court shall grant a discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt . ..
in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the date of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or had a com-
position or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way
of composition confirmed under this title .. "
1964]
